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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, the writings of prominent neoconservatives in 
the United States in response to humanitarian crises have shown remarkable 
overlap with those put forward by cosmopolitan thinkers and promoters of 
humanitarian intervention.  In both approaches, ‗humanity‘ is understood as a 
bounded and exclusive community which highly developed Western societies 
are given the ‗responsibility‘ to police on a global scale.  The cosmopolitan 
desire to transcend borders and generate a global community, in this context, 
has played directly into the hands of the most staunch advocates of the Iraq 
invasion, at least in a rhetorical sense.  Given this confluence of arguments 
on the legitimacy of military interventions for human protection purposes, 
this paper will argue that while the relationship between cosmopolitanism 
and international violence has been amplified in the context of the war on 
terror, it is an issue with deeper theoretical roots that must be understood if 
we are serious about reducing the amount of violence in the world.  In 
response, fresh consideration must be given to the terms of political inclusion 
and exclusion that have become normalised in discussions on global political 
change.  It may be that the commitment to ‗humanity‘ must be abandoned if 
human lives are to be saved. 
 
Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, neo-conservatism, humanitarian intervention, 
human rights, international law, humanity,global politics. 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union, liberal optimism about the future of the world ran high.  It was at this 
time that George H. W. Bush declared the arrival of a ‗new world order‘ in 
which: 
 
‗the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak 
against the strong ...‘  A world where the United Nations, freed 
from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of 
its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human 
rights find a home among all nations.
1
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It was, of course, a sentiment that found a more thorough-going intellectual 
grounding – as well as great controversy and consternation - in the work of 
Francis Fukuyama.
2
  This wave of optimism cannot be separated from the 
humanitarian interventions that followed throughout the 1990s, in places such 
as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.  A feeling clearly existed 
amongst the Western powers that the use of military force to counter 
aggression was now more acceptable than ever and could be justified on 
moral and political grounds. 
Contrary to the view that the attacks of September 11, 2001 
constituted a break with the humanitarian sentiments of the post-Cold War 
era, this paper will argue that the neo-conservatism that has inspired the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, in the context of a Global War on Terror, 
has much in common with the military humanitarianism that propelled the 
humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and led to the formalisation of the 
‗responsibility to protect‘ at the United Nations World Summit in 2005.  
Most importantly, I believe that the connections between these two 
approaches, and their attendant militarism, can be traced to the deployment of 
an overdetermined concept of ‗humanity‘ at the centre of their respective 
discourses. 
   
 
2. Neo-Conservative Humanitarian Militarism 
The connections between neo-conservatism, liberalism, and 
militarism are increasingly being recognised.  It is clear that the events of 
September 11, 2001, propelled the neo-conservative agenda for a 
‗benevolent‘ hegemonic United States to the forefront, contributing heavily 
to the doctrines of pre-emption and regime change that were set out in the 
National Security Strategy of 2002 and applied in the case of Iraq.  What 
needs to be clarified, however, is the fact that the ‗humanitarian‘ or 
‗democratic peace‘ arguments proffered by George W. Bush as justification 
for the invasion of Iraq are not, as many have claimed,
3
 simply an ex post 
facto attempt to bring legitimacy to  a failed policy in Iraq.  Indeed, neo-
conservatives such as William Kristol and Robert Kagan were amongst the 
foremost advocates of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and were 
critical only of the perceived failure to use enough American firepower, 
particularly in the case of Serbia in 1999. 
 In lambasting Republican opponents to the 1999 Kosovo 
intervention, Kristol and Kagan asked whether ‗the Republicans really want 
to present themselves as the party of callous indifference to human 
suffering‘4 and advocated more aggressive action against ‗men like Milosevic 
and Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-Il and the dictators in Beijing.‘5  Victory 
in Kosovo would demonstrate, moreover, that American power ‗is a potent 
force for international peace, stability, and human decency.‘6  These concerns 
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for a peaceful, stable, and ‗decent‘ international order, guided by universal 
moral principles, motivated the 1996 call by Kristol and Kagan for an 
assertive, highly-militarised, ‗neo-Reaganite‘ U.S. foreign policy.  Thus, the 
preservation of ‗benevolent hegemony‘ under the U.S. was, they claimed, 
‗the appropriate goal of American foreign policy… as far into the future as 
possible.‘7  
 For the purposes of this paper, the most important element of this 
‗benevolent‘ approach is precisely the claim to represent the interests of all 
people in all parts of the world.  While there is no consistency on the question 
of national interests and universal values amongst neoconservatives as a 
whole, all at least share some commitment to the ‗spread of freedom‘ and 
may, in this sense, be identified as ‗Wilsonian.‘8    Woodrow Wilson, of 
course, was an identifiably neo-Kantian thinker in his time, and his advocacy 
of international institutions for the establishment of collective security and 
the spread of democracy and human rights is well known.  Like Wilson, 
contemporary neo-conservatives regularly invoke the defence of 
‗civilization‘ against the threat of rogues or barbarians as one of their chief 
motivations.  In doing so, Kristol and Kagan, for example, approvingly cite 
Roosevelt‘s insistence that ‗the defenders of civilization must exercise their 
power against civilization‘s opponents.‘9  This claim to being the arbiter of 
universal values of civilized, decent human society has since been reflected 
countless times in the speeches and policy documents of the Bush 
administration.  It is closely related to Bush‘s statement that ‗moral truth is 
the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place,‘10 which marked 
his pre-Iraq war address to West Point graduates in 2002.  It is precisely these 
kinds of statements that illustrate the way in which principles of universal 
equality and human rights have fed into justifications for the infliction of 
violence in both neo-conservative theory and in U.S. foreign policy 
practice.
11
 
Another key element of the neoconservative position is their 
approach to international or global institutions.  This, indeed, is the issue that 
most would consider as separating neo-conservatives from their cosmopolitan 
counterparts: the rejection of the United Nations as a viable institution for 
overseeing the spread of liberal values and democratic institutions and the 
attendant claim that only strong U.S. leadership – or ‗benevolent hegemony‘ 
- can obtain the desired results.  Max Boot, for example, has argued in favour 
of the revival of ‗liberal imperialism‘ on the proviso that he has ‗more 
confidence in U.S. than in UN power.‘12  Similar arguments can be found 
throughout the neoconservative literature and the severe tensions between the 
Bush administration and the UN in recent years may be seen as further 
evidence of this ambivalent attitude.  
Yet the privileging of U.S. power as the basis for universal political 
transformation also has its limits amongst neoconservative thinkers, to the 
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extent that even on this institutional issue we can see much in common with 
the liberal internationalist position. Robert Kagan, for example, has recently 
suggested that a new international institution, including only nations that 
adhere to liberal-democratic principles, needs to be established in order to 
balance against the new ‗autocratic alliance‘ that is developing under the 
leadership of Russia and China.  According to Kagan, the ‗tantalising 
glimpse of a new kind of international order‘ that emerged at the end of the 
Cold War has now been replaced by the ‗normal‘ division of the world into 
competing spheres, leading to a situation where: 
 
The old competition between liberalism and absolutism has re-
emerged, with the nations of the world increasingly lining up 
between them or along the faultline of tradition and modernity – 
Islamic fundamentalism against the West.  The United States 
should pursue policies designed to both promote democracy and 
strengthen co-operation among democracies.  It should join 
with other democracies to erect new international institutions 
that both reflect and enhance their shared principles and goals – 
perhaps a new league of democratic states to hold regular 
meetings and consultations on the issues of the day.
13
 
 
This proposal for a global institution of democracies looks remarkably 
similar to the proposal put forward by liberal international lawyer Geoffrey 
Robertson in 1999, who argued that the UN should be replaced by ‗a kind of 
global NATO that would no longer be encumbered by backward or barbaric 
states.‘14  Such connections and continuities between neo-conservatism and 
cosmopolitanism, particularly as they relate to the promotion of a singular 
view of global order and reintroduce powerful notions of ‗just war‘, must be 
understood if we are to avoid some of the intensely violent struggles that are 
currently being played out in many parts of the world.  
 
3. Cosmopolitan Humanitarian Militarism 
As with neo-conservatism, it is impossible to speak of 
cosmopolitanism as a wholly unified school of thought.  For the purposes of 
this paper, I will focus upon those who have espoused universal moral 
principles as a basis for the carrying out of humanitarian interventions since 
the end of the Cold War.  In this vein, the work of Mary Kaldor, Thomas 
Franck, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alex Bellamy, Michael Ignatieff and 
Fernando Tesón,
15
 has provided a great deal of impetus to the emergence of 
the ‗responsibility to protect‘ doctrine, which gained recognition and limited 
acceptance at the 2005 UN World Summit.  Perhaps more importantly, most 
of these scholars offered their support to the 2003 invasion of Iraq on 
humanitarian grounds, with Michael Ignatieff, for example, arguing that a 
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‗military prong‘ was required to back up the political process in winning the 
war on terror and that he ‗had made the human rights judgement that 26 
million Iraqis would be better off as a consequence‘ of the invasion.16  In all 
of this work, we can clearly see the emergence of a cosmopolitan argument 
for the use of force, founded on claims about universal morality and the need 
for democratic reform at local, national, and global levels in order to realise 
these universal claims.  
 In making the case for a ‗militarised cosmopolitanism‘ the moral 
grounding is usually established, in an almost unproblematic fashion, as an 
extension of human rights theory in combination with the economic, social 
and technological interconnectedness of the current era of globalisation.  
From this basis, it is argued that those who carry out acts of violence or 
abuses of human rights that ‗shock the conscience of mankind‘17 should be 
subject to international military intervention, even if the violator claims the 
protection of state sovereignty.  In this way, the spirit of post-Cold War 
liberal optimism is carried forward into a concrete plan for the transformation 
of world order.
18
  The ‗old‘ Westphalian system of independent, sovereign 
states is said to have been replaced by the new recognition of our common 
humanity, lifting the realisation and protection of universal human rights 
above the protection of state rights.
19
  International law becomes 
cosmopolitan law as the focus turns from the state to the human individual. 
The second area of importance relates to the question of institutional 
transformation.  The question here, of  course, is: who decides when 
humanitarian interventions are legitimate or legal?  In this respect, the 
advocacy in favour of new international (or global) institutions that would 
promote Western moral and political principles as universal principles has 
not been limited to Geoffrey Robertson.  Indeed, throughout the literature on 
humanitarian intervention we can see repeated criticisms of the 
ineffectiveness of the Security Council when faced with humanitarian crises.  
Emblematic of this critique are the principles established in the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report entitled 
‗The Responsibility to Protect,‘ which gives the ‗first call‘ on interventions to 
the Security Council, but warns of the obsolescence of that body of it fails to 
act in ‗conscience-shocking situations.‘20  In such cases (and it must be noted 
that China and Russia are often singled out for blame in this context) 
authority is said to pass first to regional bodies such as NATO or the African 
Union and, failing that, to single nations or (democratic) ‗coalitions of the 
willing‘ that are prepared to act decisively against the abuser.21  This pattern 
is followed in an article that literally unites the neo-conservative and liberal 
positions, Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter‘s ‗A Duty to Prevent.‘  
Here, the authors combine the tenets of the responsibility to protect with the 
pre-emptive strike policy of the Bush Doctrine, arguing that military 
interventions may be necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation, terrorism, as 
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well as abuses of human rights or the overturning of democratic political 
arrangements.
22
 
 An objection might be raised to the effect that neo-conservatives are 
far more interested in advancing U.S. national interest than they are in 
creating a peaceful global order and that the neo-conservative commitment to 
human rights and democracy is nothing more than a self-serving ‗noble lie‘ 
that is designed to unite the American people around a common, nationalistic 
mythology.
23
  While there may be some truth in this, it still begs the question 
as to how liberal principles of individual freedom, human rights, and 
democracy can be espoused by two very separate theoretical traditions and 
can lead directly to the problematic conclusion that we must make war in 
order to win the peace. As Ulrich Beck has argued, we must recognise ‗the 
paradox that the successful institutionalization of the cosmopolitan regime 
that serves the objective of securing the world conjures up the contrary: the 
legitimization and legalization of war.‘
24
 
 
 
4. The Problem with Global Humanity 
The question that now needs some consideration is: what is it that 
neoconservatives and liberal cosmopolitans share in common that leads to 
this problematic attachment to violence as a path to a better future?  The 
answer, I believe, can be found in the attachment to an abstract concept of 
‗humanity‘ as the basis for achieving world peace. It is necessary, therefore, 
to ask serious questions about ‗humanity‘ in the early twenty-first century: 
Are all biological humans automatically considered members of this group?  
If not, how do some people become excluded and what are the consequences 
of this exclusion?  The approach that I want to take in the following brief 
discussion of these questions is to understand ‗humanity‘ not as a pregiven 
biological category, but as a political discourse.  Such an approach has a 
number of important consequences, not least of which is the impetus to 
understand ‗humanity‘ not as a universal community, but as one which only 
gains its coherence and meaning in the face of the ‗constitutive outsider‘. 
 This critique of discourses of ‗humanity‘ has united a variety of 
scholars against the war in Iraq (and the war on terror more broadly), who see 
contemporary Western leaders – most notably Bush and Blair – as engaging 
in a kind of liberal imperialism.
25
  What has emerged, in response, is a 
defence of pluralism that draws upon the critique of moral universalism put 
forward by conservative or ‗Realist‘ traditions of international relations as 
well as new theories of discourse that seek to affirm, rather than efface, the 
irreducible variety and ceaseless transformation of global politics.  
This synthesis of two very different schools of thought is perhaps 
best represented in the renewed interest in the work of German legal theorist, 
Carl Schmitt, who, in writing of the failures of the Weimar Republic, best 
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pinpointed the dangers of an emergent liberal humanitarianism in 
international politics as a recipe for ongoing wars of intervention.  Within the 
context of his broader reading of (international) politics as the process of 
demarcating ‗Friend‘ (freund) from ‗Enemy‘ (fiend),26 Schmitt saw the 
development of a ‗moralistic‘ doctrine of war, supported by the thin liberal 
legalism of the League of Nations, as a grave danger.
27
  The key indicator of 
the emergence of this problem lay in the increasing use of the term 
‗humanity‘ as the basis of a grievance which could justify war.  Thus the 
problem, according to Schmitt, was that: 
 
Humanity as such cannot wage a war because it has no enemy, 
at least not on this planet… When a state fights its political 
enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of 
humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a 
universal concept against its military opponent.  At the expense 
of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the 
same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and 
civilization in order to claim these as one‘s own and deny the 
same to the enemy.
28
 
 
For Schmitt, this characterisation of war as a battle for ‗humanity‘ was 
indicative of the evaporation of any sense of control or ‗formalism‘ in the 
conduct of war, opening up the potential to unleash horrific wars of 
annihilation which had previously been constrained by the European public 
law notion of war as a ‗duel between formal states.‘29  In contrast to this more 
conservative and ‗balanced‘ legal tradition, guided by the principles of 
sovereignty inaugurated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the new legal 
moralism of liberal internationalists such as Woodrow Wilson would, 
according to Schmitt, lead to war without restraint, as:   
 
To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize 
such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as 
denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring 
him to be an outlaw of humanity; and war can thereby be 
driven to the most extreme inhumanity.
30
 
 
Finnish legal theorist Martti Koskenniemi further summarises Schmitt‘s 
argument, with particular reference to the idea of a humanitarian war, in 
explaining that: 
 
The humanitarian war becomes a war of annihilation 
(Vernichtungskrieg), a global civil war where the enemy does 
not have the dignity of a State and resistance will appear as ‗the 
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illegal and immoral resistance of a few delinquents, 
troublemakers, pirates and gangsters.‘31 
 
Basing his argument on this fundamental question of definition, Schmitt 
contended that the notion of humanitarian war that he identified pointed to a 
larger crisis within international law, which he saw as being entirely 
beholden to political power and, consequently, imperialist ambition.
32
 Hence, 
any attempt to claim authority for international acts through international law 
was, in effect, a particular political claim rather than a universal moral or 
legal claim, and should be acknowledged as such, not blurred by the rhetoric 
of ‗humanity‘.33 This move away from the notion of equal and independent 
nation states toward a hierarchised and morally divided world was, for 
Schmitt, indicative of the transformation of the global spatial order, with 
certain political consequences, heralding the arrival of a new ‗nomos of the 
Earth.‘  The re-emergence of ‗just wars,‘ so central to the narratives of both 
neo-conservatives and cosmopolitans in recent years, is perhaps the most 
telling (and worrying) symptom of this transformation.
34
 
 What we are left with, therefore, is the conviction on the part of 
many scholars and policy-makers, both neo-conservative and cosmopolitan, 
that their particular ‗way of life‘ is the only decent way of life.  Or, as the 
title of this paper suggests, that they (or we) are the world.  Such a claim can 
be heard in the constant and unproblematic use of the terms ‗humanity‘ or 
‗international community‘ when aggressive foreign policies are being 
explained and justified.  Regardless of the theoretical principles that we begin 
with, or the ends that we have in mind, the problem that will be encountered 
is that in any militarised discourse of ‗humanity‘ there can be no room for 
living with an exterior other, and that in order to maintain a sense of logic or 
truth the subhuman, the inhuman, or the animal must be constantly identified, 
effaced, and erased.  Interventionist wars, from this perspective, represent the 
endless ‗coming into being‘ of the pure community of humanity.   
Must it be said, therefore, that cosmopolitanism must be abandoned 
if we want to avoid further brutal wars such as the one currently under way in 
Iraq?  Not necessarily.  I would argue that what is necessary is a sustained 
challenge to the dominant schools of contemporary cosmopolitanism that 
exhibit such a strong attachment to the exercise of force in striving for their 
peaceful ends.  There is, of course, much to be admired and much to be 
preserved in the long history of cosmopolitan thought, so it would be wrong 
to ‗throw the baby out with the bathwater‘.  But the problematic attachment 
to a singular notion of ‗humanity‘ must be subject to rigorous critique in 
order to avoid the extremes of violence that it might produce. The realisation 
of a cosmopolitan order, from this perspective, should not entail the simple 
declaration that we have found the key to a perfect world and the deployment 
of troops to cut down anyone who appears to oppose it.  Instead, we should 
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investigate the possibility of a cosmopolitanism that reflects the infinite 
variety of the cosmos, and does not simply collapse the many into one. 
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sovereignty that may previously have helped to shield states against 
intervention.  This is certainly the view taken by Koskenniemi, who argues 
that: ‗Schmitt‘s legacy was to inaugurate a dynamic and deformalized 
concept of law that would show its usefulness as the symbol of the concrete 
order that American power was able to produce.‘ See Koskenniemi, The 
Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-
1960, at 483. 
34
 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. G. L. Ulmen; New York, 
Telos Press, 2003, at 320-22. 
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